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This article introduces customer stewardship control (CSC) to the marketing field. This concept represents a
frontline employee’s felt ownership of and moral responsibility for customers’ overall welfare. In two studies, the
authors show that CSC is a more encompassing construct than customer orientation, which reflects a frontline
employee’s focus on meeting customers’ needs. They provide evidence that the former is more potent in shaping
in- and extra-role employee behaviors. Moreover, they highlight how CSC operates in conjunction with an
organization’s agency control system: Stewardship’s positive influence on in- and extra-role behavior is weaker in
the presence of high agency control. They offer actionable advice about how to solve the resulting managerial
control dilemma. Finally, the authors show that CSC depends on drivers that reside at the individual level
(employee relatedness), the team level (team competence), or both levels of aggregation (employee and team
autonomy). These findings show how to effectively design a frontline employee’s work environment to ensure
optimal frontline performance.
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In the past decade, many examples of mismanagement,ethical misconduct, and the treatment of customers asexternalities have severely damaged firms’ relational
equity with their customers—particularly at the points at
which employees interact with customers. In the financial
service sector, management contrived customer needs, for-
malized those needs in guidelines and performance indica-
tors, and incentivized service staff to pursue these out-
comes. Frontline workers then displayed behavior aimed at
achieving personal goals, and many examples emerged of
how customers were sold products that were by no means in
their best interest (Smith 2012). In response, stakeholders
have urged companies to act more responsibly in serving
customers; for example, in the United Kingdom, the 2010
Stewardship Code illustrates practices that can stimulate
responsible customer service and safeguard financial con-
sumers’ interests (Financial Reporting Council 2010).
Recent theorizing on managerial control systems (i.e.,
how customer contact employees are governed) also recog-
nizes that the nature of current control paradigms is at the
heart of self-centered frontline behavior and therefore may
need to be reconsidered (Kwortnik, Lynn, and Ross 2009).
Traditional control systems are rooted in agency theory,
which regards employees as rational, opportunistic actors
and advises managers to control them formally through
monitoring and rewarding, in line with clear, preset goals
(Eisenhardt 1989). However, it may not be possible to align
formal performance indicators with heterogeneous cus-
tomer interests in a dynamic service environment. In service-
oriented firms such as Zappo’s, Southwest Airlines, Lands’
End, and the Ritz-Carlton, employees go to great lengths to
address customer needs and “violate” preset performance
parameters, such as average handling time (Durham 2011;
Gallo 2007; Taylor 2008). Such actions are not driven by
agency instruments but rather by a deeply instilled sense of
accountability for customers’ welfare.
A growing consensus among managerial theorists there-
fore implies that synergies between employees’ performance
goals and customer interests are possible if control systems
regard frontline employees as stewards of customers (Block
1996; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Hernandez
2008, 2012; Tosi et al. 2003). Rather than controlling
employee behavior with rules and monitoring, stewardship
theorists assert that perceptions of problem ownership and
responsibility underlie employees’ determination to perform
because they become vested in customer outcomes. In this
case, relationships between employees and their customers
are characterized by a sense of moral responsibility that is not
formally imposed but originates in a covenantal relationship
between the two parties (Caldwell and Karri 2005; Hernan-
dez 2012). The felt responsibility exerts substantive informal
influence on employees’ behavior. Thus, employee self-
regulation by stewardship principles may be a viable alter-
native to agency control.
Despite increasing studies on stewardship governance, a
debate continues about whether control systems based on
principles (i.e., stewardship) compete with or are comple-
mentary to control systems that favor principals (i.e.,
agency) (Albanese, Dacin, and Harris 1997; Davis, Schoor-
man, and Donaldson 1997). Few empirical studies offer
guidance about how control systems relate to specific types
of employee behavior. Furthermore, it remains unclear
whether a central focus on customer welfare is conceptually
and empirically distinct from the widely used construct of
customer orientation (CO). Research also has not explored
which aspects of the organizational context are conducive
to stewardship control. Therefore, the general aim of this
study is to introduce the concept of customer stewardship
control (CSC), identify its antecedents, and demonstrate
that it is a more encompassing construct than CO in terms
of explaining employee behavior. More specifically, we
pursue three main research contributions.
First, we define CSC as a frontline employee’s felt owner-
ship of and moral responsibility for customers’ overall welfare.
It can be embedded in marketing control theory as an informal
control mechanism because it is initiated by employees (Hart-
line, Maxham, and McKee 2000). Extant marketing control
studies that consider informal controls together with formal
counterparts tend to report ambiguous results about effects
on individual performance (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani
1996; Cravens et al. 2004), perhaps because their often generic
performance measures commingle different service employee
behaviors. In contrast, we relate informal (i.e., customer
steward ship) and formal (i.e., agency) controls to in-role
behaviors (IRBs) and extra-role behaviors (ERBs) and thereby
provide a finer-grained analysis of the behavioral effects of
marketing controls. We thus also empirically address the
broader debate about whether agency and stewardship prin-
ciples are competing or complementary.
Second, we argue that CSC is conceptually distinct from
other constructs. We focus specifically on CO and argue
that CSC is a more encompassing construct. Whereas CO
represents a focus on meeting customers’ needs (Donavan,
Brown, and Mowen 2004), stewardship is a broader con-
cept that reflects employees’ felt ownership of and moral
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responsibility for customers’ overall welfare. Our results
show that CSC is a more potent driver of IRB and ERB.
Third, in line with self-determination theory (Ryan and
Deci 2000), we propose autonomy, competence, and related-
ness of employees and teams as predictors of CSC. In addi-
tion to advancing stewardship theory, this approach adds to
marketing control theory, in which scholars note that infor-
mal controls entail different levels of aggregation (Jaworski
1988) but have generally employed individual-level analy-
ses. We take a multilevel approach to identify the most
effective drivers of CSC because we acknowledge that per-
ceptions of control mechanisms often are influenced by
team structures (De Jong, De Ruyter, and Lemmink 2004).
We show that shared team-level perceptions of the work
environment explain additional variance in CSC percep-
tions, beyond individual-level drivers. 
Figure 1 presents the conceptual model that is central to
this article. We proceed to examine this by presenting two
studies. In Study 1, we show how CSC and agency control
differentially relate to employee behavior and compare the
predictive ability of CSC and CO. In Study 2, we determine
the antecedents of CSC. 
Theoretical Framework
Conceptual Roots
Agency and stewardship theory are two key, inextricably
linked theories used to describe the relationships between an
organization’s management and its stakeholders (Davis,
Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997; Tosi et al. 2003). Agency
theory posits that external controls (e.g., monitoring, rewards)
are necessary to prevent managers from acting opportunisti-
cally; stewardship theory holds that their interests can be
aligned with those of shareholders, such that managers’ per-
sonal efforts benefit not only their individual interests but
others’ welfare as well (Hernandez 2008). Although agency
theory has a long-standing history in academic research, the
notion of stewardship is fairly recent in organizational and
marketing literature. Theorists continue to define and con-
ceptually distinguish stewardship from related concepts.
The foundations of stewardship can be traced to the notion
of covenantal relationships (Hernandez 2012), which reflects
a sense of moral responsibility between two actors that ties
them to an implicit obligation not to take advantage of each
other (Caldwell and Karri 2005). Employees act in the best
interests of the other(s) in the relationship because they per-
ceive that behaviors that fit their moral compass have a
greater utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors
(Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997). Because these
behaviors benefit the collective rather than the individual,
employees may bridge competing strategic goals, such as
priorities for quality service versus transactional efficiency.
Stewardship scholars outline responsibility and psycho-
logical ownership as the underlying motives that align the
interests of different stakeholders (Block 1996; Davis,
Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997). Employees who feel
responsible for work outcomes fulfill role obligations in
exchange for collective recognition and a reinforcement of
their work ideology (Hernandez 2012). Behaviors that fail
to advance the welfare of others and do not align with one’s
ideology are corrected through self-regulation (Tosi et al.
2003). Stewardship also embraces the idea of service to and
improvement of managed assets (Block 1996). Psychologi-
cal ownership—which exists in the absence of any formal
assignment of ownership—makes employees perceive others’
interests as their own. Workers are intrinsically motivated to
avoid exposing others to undue harm or loss when they
share their interests (Hernandez 2008; Pierce, Kostova, and
Dirks 2001).
Given its other-regarding focus, stewardship theory may
be particularly valuable for understanding the interactions
among frontline employees, their customers, and their orga-
nization (De Ruyter, De Jong, and Wetzels 2009; Hernan-
dez 2008). We propose that a governance strategy based on
stewardship principles is most effective when frontline
employees develop covenantal relationships with their most
proximal entity: their customers.
CSC and Related Concepts
As with many embryonic research streams, stewardship
shares conceptual territory with related concepts. This sec-
tion compares and contrasts those concepts with CSC, in an
attempt to clarify how they relate and obtain more detailed
insights into the added value of the stewardship concept.
Customer orientation. Research on CO takes place at
both the organizational (Kennedy, Goolsby, and Arnould
2003; Kohli and Jaworski 1990) and the individual (Brown
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et al. 2002; Donavan, Brown, and Mowen 2004; Thomas,
Soutar, and Ryan 2001) levels of analysis. The latter stream
relates most closely to CSC because it channels the inter-
personal contact between employees and customers. Among
individual-level studies, some scholars view CO as a set of
behaviors that workers display to identify and meet cus-
tomer needs and interests (Bettencourt and Brown 2003;
Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann 2011b), while others con-
ceptualize it as an employee’s predisposition to meet cus-
tomer needs in an on-the-job context (Brown et al. 2002;
Donavan, Brown, and Mowen 2004), or as a work value
that guides employees’ job perceptions and attitudes
(Zablah et al. 2012). Regardless of CO’s conceptualization,
we consider stewardship a more encompassing construct
that is more suitable to shape frontline employee behaviors
because of its focus on customer welfare.
Other concepts. Servant leadership, total quality manage-
ment, and organizational identification are also related con-
ceptually to CSC, but with some clear differences. Table 1
provides an overview of their commonalities and differences.
Study 1
Behavioral Outcomes of Agency and Customer
Stewardship Control
Frontline employee behaviors. Previous studies that investi-
gate the impacts of formal and informal controls on
FIGURE 1
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CO (Predisposition) CO (Behavior) CO (Organization Level)
Definition “An employee’s tendency or predisposition to meet
customer needs in an on-the-job context” (Brown
et al. 2002, p. 111)
“Behavior that is designed to build the customer’s
satisfaction and satisfy customer needs over the long
term” (Rozell, Pettijohn, and Parker 2004, p. 407)
“The sufficient understanding of one’s target buy-
ers to be able to create superior value for them
continuously” (Narver and Slater 1990, p. 21)
Antecedents
(selected 
studies)
Activity (Brown et al. 2002); agreeableness (Brown
et al. 2002; Licata et al. 2003); instability (Brown et
al. 2002); job resourcefulness (Licata et al. 2003);
learning orientation (Harris, Mowen, and Brown
2005)
Gender (Franke and Park 2006); emotional intelli-
gence (Rozell, Pettijohn, and Parker 2004); experi-
ence (Franke and Park 2006); organizational com-
mitment (Pettijohn, Pettijohn, and Taylor 2002);
organizational identification (Wieseke et al. 2007);
job satisfaction, sales skills (Pettijohn, Pettijohn, and
Taylor 2002)
Leader commitment (Kennedy, Goolsby, and
Arnould 2003); customer performance feedback
(Kennedy, Goolsby, and Arnould 2003); interde-
partmental coordination (Kennedy, Goolsby, and
Arnould 2003); technological turbulence (Calan-
tone, Harmancioglu, and Droge 2010)
Outcomes
(selected 
studies)
Altruism (Donavan, Brown, and Mowen 2004);
burnout (negative; Babakus, Yavas, and Ashill
2009, 2011); job satisfaction (Babakus, Yavas, and
Ashill 2009; Donavan, Brown, and Mowen 2004;
Rod and Ashill 2010); organizational commitment
(Donavan, Brown, and Mowen 2004; Rod and
Ashill 2010); person–job fit (Babakus, Yavas, and
Ashill 2011); self-rated performance (Brown et al.
2002; Licata et al. 2003; Yavas and Babakus
2010); work satisfaction (Harris, Mowen, and
Brown 2005)
Customer attitude toward salesperson (Homburg,
Müller, and Klarmann 2011b); customer attitude
toward products (Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann
2011b); customer loyalty (Homburg, Müller, and Klar-
mann 2011a); customer value (Blocker et al. 2011);
employee service performance (Brady and Cronin
2001); job satisfaction (Franke and Park 2006);
physical goods quality (Brady and Cronin 2001);
sales performance (Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann
2011b); self-rated performance (Franke and Park
2006; Rozell, Pettijohn, and Parker 2004); ser-
vicescape quality (Brady and Cronin 2001)
Adaptive selling confidence (Román and
Iacobucci 2010); business performance (Desh-
pandé, Farley, and Webster 1993); customer-
qualification skills (Román and Iacobucci 2010);
customer trust toward the firm (Luo, Hsu, and Liu
2008); customer commitment toward the firm
(Luo, Hsu, and Liu 2008); customer satisfaction
(Gray et al. 1998); customer loyalty (Gray et al.
1998); customer-related responsiveness (Hom-
burg, Grozdanovic, and Klarmann 2007); innova-
tion consequences (Grinstein 2008); intrinsic
motivation, role ambiguity (Román and Iacobucci
2010)
How it 
differs from
CSC
Customer orientation is a relatively stable, individ-
ual surface trait that influences attitudes and job
behaviors through a focus on meeting customer
needs (Flaherty et al. 2009; Licata et al. 2003). In
contrast, CSC is a more encompassing construct
that focuses on customers’ overall welfare rather
than needs. It can be implemented by managerial
actions such as building team structures. 
Customer orientation represents behaviors; CSC rep-
resents feelings of responsibility and ownership that
influence behaviors through self-regulatory pro-
cesses. It therefore reflects an informal control mech-
anism.
Whereas CO is a firm-level concept, representing
an organizational climate or organization-wide
skills, CSC is an individual-level concept repre-
senting an informal self-control mechanism.
TABLE 1
CSC and Related Concepts
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Servant Leadership Total Quality Management (TQM) Organizational Identification
Definition “An understanding and practice of leadership that
places the good of those led over the self-interest
of the leader, emphasizing leader behaviors that
focus on follower development, and de-emphasiz-
ing glorification of the leader” (Hale and Fields
2007, p. 397)
“A company-wide effort seeking to install and make
permanent a climate where employees will continu-
ously improve their ability to provide on-demand
products and services that customers will find of par-
ticular value” (Ciampa 1992, p. xxii)
“Oneness with or belongingness to an entity,
where the individual defines him or herself in
terms of the entity to which he or she is a mem-
ber” (Mael and Ashforth 1992, p. 104)
Antecedents
(selected 
studies)
Culture (Van Dierendonck 2011); leader empathy,
integrity, competence, and agreeableness (Wash-
ington, Sutton, and Feild 2006); motivation to
serve (Ng, Koh, and Goh 2008); self-determination
(Van Dierendonck, Nuijten, and Heeren 2009)
Elements: a sense of ownership in the product or
service delivered to the customer, feeling of code-
pendence, a widespread attitude of wanting to excel
and constantly improve, employees regarding their
work as meaningful
Communication climate (Smidts, Pruyn, and Van
Riel 2001); distributive/procedural justice
(Walumbwa, Cropanzano, and Hartnell 2009);
manager organizational identification (Wieseke et
al. 2009); organization mission fulfillment (Suh et
al. 2011); perceived external expertise (Smidts,
Pruyn, and Van Riel 2001)
Outcomes
(selected 
studies)
Affect-based trust in leader (Schaubroeck, Lam,
and Peng 2011); burnout (negative, Babakus,
Yavas, and Ashill 2011); commitment to supervisor
(Walumbwa, Hartnell, and Oke 2010); organiza-
tional citizenship behavior (Ehrhart 2004); proce-
dural justice climate (Ehrhart 2004; Walumbwa,
Hartnell, and Oke 2010); person–job fit (Babakus,
Yavas, and Ashill 2011); promotion regulatory
focus (Neubert et al. 2008); self-efficacy, service
climate (Walumbwa, Hartnell, and Oke 2010);
team potency, team performance (Hu and Liden
2011)
Brand purchase value (Tsai 2005); operating income
(Hendricks and Singhal 1997); sales growth (Barron
and Paulson Gjerde 1996); stock price performance
(Hendricks and Singhal 2001)
Affective commitment (Suh et al. 2011); continu-
ous improvement (Lee 2004); CO (Wieseke et al.
2007); employee performance (Wieseke et al.
2009); promise accuracy (Celsi and Gilly 2010);
value congruence (Celsi and Gilly 2010); volun-
tary learning behavior (Walumbwa, Cropanzano,
and Hartnell 2009)
How it 
differs from
CSC
Servant leadership describes the relationship
between a leader and followers; CSC takes the
employee–customer interface as a point of depar-
ture. A servant leader makes employees perform
desirable behaviors because they “want to give
something back in return for the leader’s support-
iveness” (Ehrhart 2004, p. 70). Stewards are gov-
erned by aligning their interests with those of the
customer, which intrinsically motivates them to
protect customer welfare.
Stewardship reflects a specific employee-held sense
of responsibility and ownership for customer’s overall
welfare, but TQM cannot be represented by one or
just a few concepts; it involves the application and
synthesis of many methods. In addition, stewardship
regulates employees through a self-induced control
mechanism based on their covenantal relationship
with the customer. In contrast, TQM has a more
inward-looking perspective; employees develop a
sense of ownership toward their company’s prob-
lems, not the customer’s.
Organizational identification reflects a feeling of
organizational membership that builds self-
esteem and motivates people to think and act on
the basis of organizational shared norms rather
than individual interests. However, internal norms
do not necessarily benefit the customer’s welfare.
In contrast, CSC has an outward-looking perspec-
tive because employees feel accountable for the
customer, not only the organization of which they
perceive themselves to be members.
TABLE 1
Continued
employee performance reveal ambiguous findings. Challa-
galla and Shervani (1996) report lower individual perfor-
mance in response to formal control mechanisms; Lusch
and Jaworski (1991) and Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and
Krishnan (1993) report insignificant effects; and Cravens et
al. (2004) find performance peaks in the presence of both
types of control. These inconclusive results may reflect
their inconsistent operationalizations of performance. For
example, Cravens et al. aggregate self-rated behavioral and
outcome components of performance, but Challagalla and
Shervani combine self-ratings of goal attainment (“quickly
generating sales”) and helping behavior (“assisting your
sales supervisor”).
To disentangle the different processes and outcomes, we
distinguish between IRB and ERB (MacKenzie, Podsakoff,
and Ahearne 1998; Netemeyer, Maxham, and Pullig 2005).
With IRB, workers fulfill formally required tasks by dis-
playing “expected employee behaviors in serving the firm’s
customers” (Bettencourt and Brown 1997, p. 42). Expecta-
tions of IRB mainly stem from the explicit responsibilities
outlined in job descriptions and performance evaluations
forms. For example, employees in customer service centers
often must follow service scripts that prescribe and guide
customer interactions. Typical standards require employees
to answer calls within three rings, reply to e-mails within 24
hours, practice specific opening or closing procedures,
update customer data logs, and so on.
In contrast, ERB reflects employees’ discretionary
efforts that are not captured in formal job descriptions
(MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Ahearne 1998; Netemeyer,
Maxham, and Pullig 2005). Bettencourt and Brown (1997)
suggest that ERB includes employees’ extra efforts to take
initiatives that improve service in interactions with cus-
tomers or conscientious efforts to respond to customer con-
cerns. Therefore, ERB often is the extent to which a service
employee “goes the extra mile” for customers during ser-
vice encounters (Netemeyer, Maxham, and Pullig 2005, p.
132). For example, field service engineers might proac-
tively identify changes in customer behavior or recognize
that tweaking an existing product or service would better
satisfy the customer’s needs (Schepers et al. 2011). They
make changes on the spot, though they often are not
required to do so according to their job description or ser-
vice guidelines.
Effects of CSC on frontline employee behavior. By
establishing a covenantal relationship with customers,
employees become stewards and develop a self-regulatory
mechanism in which customer welfare is an important per-
sonal objective. Stewards have a clear internal belief about
suitable behaviors in service encounters. They understand
the importance of adhering to in-role procedures because
these are necessary to standardize and safeguard the quality
of service delivery across encounters. As stewards feel
responsible for the overall welfare of their entire customer
base, they perform more in-role tasks.
Job tasks that are not formalized or externally rewarded
still could be performed when self-actualization motivates
people to move beyond a current state of affairs (Argyris
1973). Because stewardship aligns interests, additional
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employee efforts that follow from self-actualization also
benefit the customer, in the form of ERB. Moreover, psy-
chological ownership of customer interests provides
employees with the belief that they can affect the “owned”
object as a result of their personal actions (Hernandez 2012)
and increases their willingness to take risks to correct prob-
lems more comprehensively (Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks
2001). For example, an employee may realize that a cus-
tomer solution does not improve customer welfare, even if
it matches service prescriptions and generates an income for
the organization. When enhancing customer welfare also
maximizes individual utility, employees feel motivated to
experiment with routines beyond their tried-and-tested ser-
vice scripts. They may proactively recognize latent cus-
tomer needs and take actions to adapt the value offer
accordingly. Thus:
H1: Frontline employee perceptions of CSC positively influ-
ence IRB.
H2: Frontline employee perceptions of CSC positively influ-
ence ERB.
Effects of agency control on frontline employee behavior.
Agency theory asserts that employees are likely to shirk
their responsibilities (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).
Therefore, principals (e.g., managers, owners) may impose
formalized control structures, such as the formulation of
specific performance goals (Challagalla and Shervani
1996), the installation of a monitoring system (Tosi et al.
2003), or the provision of rewards that tie pay to rule com-
pliance or firm performance (Davis, Schoorman, and Don-
aldson 1997). We define agency control as the extent to
which management imposes goal setting, monitoring, and
contingent reward control structures on employees.
Agency control establishes a framework of structures
and rules that condition frontline employees to behave
according to prescriptions. Employees who perceive high
degrees of agency control work to follow formalized mana-
gerial directions, in the hope of invoking favorable reac-
tions. However, the strict elicitation of standards and scripts
may instill feelings of pressure and surveillance that under-
mine intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999),
which prevents employees from spontaneously performing
desirable on- and off-the-job behaviors that are not explicitly
recognized by the formal reward system. Employees behave
because they have to, not because they want to, and are less
likely to exhibit discretionary behaviors. In summary,
H3: Frontline employee perceptions of agency control posi-
tively influence IRB.
H4: Frontline employee perceptions of agency control nega-
tively influence ERB.
Interactive Effects of Agency and Customer
Stewardship Control
Following marketing control literature, the full impact of
control mechanisms might be captured only by accounting
for the simultaneous use of multiple controls (Jaworski
1988). Proponents of stewardship theory also have empha-
sized that stewardship outcomes may be contingent on spe-
cific organizational structures (Hernandez 2008, p. 122).
We propose that agency control stresses organizational
guidelines and structures and therefore moderates the posi-
tive effects of CSC on employee behaviors.
First, under CSC, employees may be motivated to
adhere to role-prescribed tasks because this ensures a base-
line level of service quality. If obedience to these rules is not
strictly monitored, the frontline worker must infer the rele-
vance of service standards from his or her responsibility for
customers’ welfare. Goal-setting theory (Latham and Locke
2002) suggests that prescribed goals may serve a directive
function in such situations because they allow employees to
focus their attention and effort on goal-relevant, rather than
goal-irrelevant, activities. The strict elicitation and monitor-
ing of standards thus provides guidance when the unstruc-
tured context of a service encounter fails to do so. Such an
agency-controlled condition intensifies customer stewards’
motivation to align their obligation to protect and improve
customer welfare with working to meet organizational rules.
Thus, we expect that agency control leverages the positive
effect of CSC on IRB and hypothesize the following:
H5: As agency control increases, the positive relationship
between CSC and IRB becomes stronger.
Second, we hypothesize that an increase in CSC is asso-
ciated with additional employee efforts to go the extra mile
for the customer. However, with increasing agency control,
an ever-larger share of personal resources cannot be
deployed for ERB because time and effort are needed for
formal reporting to supervisors (Netemeyer, Maxham, and
Pullig 2005). An employee who feels responsible for cus-
tomer welfare but must explicitly follow and acknowledge
managerial markers therefore experiences a narrower win-
dow of opportunities to display ERB. In addition, enhanced
levels of agency control focus an employee’s attention on
formal goals to a greater extent and reduce the salience of
other ways in which an employee can help a customer, such
as exploring new pathways and providing “out of the box”
customer solutions (Vecchio, Justin, and Pearce 2008).
Thus, when agency control increases, an increase in CSC
transforms into ERB to a lesser extent because an
employee’s attention is less focused on going the extra mile.
H6: As agency control increases, the positive relationship
between CSC and ERB becomes weaker.
Method
Research setting. We collected data over a six-month period
from employees and managers of a medical equipment
manufacturer’s European customer contact center. Employ-
ees in the contact center answer customer inquiries about
product usage, initiate recovery measures after product fail-
ures, provide information about the product line, and offer
unsolicited help and advice. Employees can contact cus-
tomers by telephone, e-mail, social media, and home (e.g.,
patients) or office (e.g., physicians, hospitals, universities)
visits. In the first stage, we asked four managers for their
understanding of employees’ ERB; they consistently char-
acterized it as the proactive identification of customer prob-
lems or changes in product usage.
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In the second stage, we collected quantitative data from
customer contact employees and their supervisors. To avoid
reverse causality and endogeneity concerns, we collected
employee perceptions of the control mechanisms at t = 1,
then gathered supervisors’ behavioral ratings at t = 2, six
months later, in accordance with supervisors’ semiannual,
formal staff appraisal cycles. After an initial pretest, 298
customer contact employees (75% response rate) partici-
pated in the survey. For 88% of this sample, we could col-
lect supervisor ratings on employee IRB and ERB. The
final matched sample thus consisted of 262 employees and
32 supervisors.
Sample characteristics. Of the 262 responding employ-
ees, 42% were men. In addition, 15% were younger than 26
years of age, 39% were 26–35 years, and 46% were 36
years or older; their average organizational tenure was 4.2
years. Moreover, 30% had associate’s degrees, 36% bache-
lor’s degrees, and 34% graduate degrees. Among the super-
visors, 72% were men; 8% were 26–35 years of age, 60%
were 36–45 years of age, and 32% were 46 years or older;
and 81% of them had been with the company for five years
or more.
Measurement. We used multi-item scales from existing
research whenever possible, and we provide a list of the
items for our core constructs and their psychometric proper-
ties in Table 2. Construct-level correlations for all con-
structs are in Table 3. The scores all came from a confirma-
tory factor analysis (CFA), using the robust maximum
likelihood estimator in AMOS17. This analysis showed sat-
isfactory global fit measures: 2(585) = 1182.5, confirma-
tory fit index (CFI) = .93, Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) = .92,
and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) =
.06. All items loaded significantly on the hypothesized
latent variables, and the composite reliability (CR) values
were all greater than .7. All constructs adhered to the com-
monly applied Fornell and Larcker (1981) criterion, in sup-
port of discriminant validity. More specifically, CSC and
CO were distinct measures as the average variances
extracted (AVEs) (.68 and .63 respectively) exceeded their
squared correlation (.23). In addition, Table 4 shows a prin-
cipal component analysis with Oblimin rotation; the five
CSC and the five CO items loaded on separate components,
and all cross-loadings were below .4, providing further evi-
dence of convergent and discriminant validity of the scales.
Employees indicated their (dis)agreement with each
statement using a seven-point Likert-type scale. We estab-
lished the five CSC items by studying theoretical sources
(Block 1996; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997) and
conducting interviews with four managers and eight front-
line employees. Our operationalization reflects employees’
internal perceptions, which previous studies have indicated
is the correct way to capture self-regulatory informal con-
trols (e.g., Flaherty, Arnold, and Hunt 2007). Our philoso-
phy for capturing agency control was based on theoretical
considerations, so we conceptualized three dimensions of
agency control: goal setting, captured with items from Para-
suraman, Berry, and Zeithaml (1991) and Kazanjian and
Rao (1999); monitoring, assessed with four items from
Jaworski and MacInnis (1989); and contingent reward,
which consists of four items adapted from Lytle, Hom, and
Mokwa (1998) and Bass and Avolio (2000). We assessed
CO with five items from Thomas, Soutar, and Ryan (2001).
Supervisors rated subordinates’ IRB and ERB1; they
could do so accurately because the company featured a
transparent office layout, held semimonthly “jour fixes,”
and transmitted information from in-house trainers and
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mystery callers. We used the scale by Bettencourt and
Brown (1997) to assess IRB and four questions proposed by
Netemeyer, Maxham, and Pullig (2005) to measure ERB.
The response options ranged from 1 (“never”) to 7 (“as
often as possible”). At the outset of the survey, we provided
specific information and examples of what we understood
as IRB (e.g., answer calls within three rings, maintain per-
TABLE 2
Study 1: Measures and Measurement Criteria
Factor
Variable Loading CR AVE
CSC .91 .68
I feel a sense of responsibility for the customer. .87
I feel a sense of accountability for the customer. .86
I sense that the customers I serve are MY customers. .83
I feel a sense of ownership of the customer’s problems. .76
I feel responsible for customer welfare. .79
Agency Control: Goal Setting .87 .63
My company has a formal process for setting the quality of service goals for employees. .76
My supervisor sets specific quality of service goals. .85
There are explicit, internally published objectives for service employee performance. .76
My supervisor uses established rules and procedures by which goals for service delivery .80
are determined. 
Agency Control: Monitoring .90 .69
The extent to which I follow established service procedures is critically monitored. .68
The procedures to accomplish a given service task are explicitly regulated. .91
My immediate boss modifies my work procedures when desired results are not obtained. .80
Feedback on how to accomplish my performance goals is frequently communicated to me. .91
Agency Control: Contingent Rewards .89 .68
My supervisor…
•Provides incentives and rewards at all levels for service quality, not just productivity. .84
•Lets us celebrate excellent service through service reward systems. .85
•Makes clear what one can expect to receive when performance goals are achieved. .77
•Expresses satisfaction when I meet expectations. .83
CO .89 .63
I try to figure out a customer’s needs. .86
I have the customer’s best interests in mind. .71
I try to find out which kinds of products or services would be most helpful to customers. .72
I recommend products or services that are best suited to solving problems. .86
I take a problem solving approach in selling products or services to customers. .80
In-Role Behavior (IRB) (rated by supervisors) .82 .53
Within the last 6 months, how often did this employee...
•Meet formal performance requirements when serving customers? .74
•Perform all those tasks for customers that were required of him/her? .78
•Adequately complete all expected customer service behaviors? .65
•Help customers with those things that are required of him/her? .74
Extra-Role Behavior (ERB) (rated by supervisors) .88 .66
Within the last 6 months, how often did this employee...
•Go above and beyond the “call of duty” when serving customers? .83
•Willingly go out of his/her way to make a customer satisfied? .80
•Help customers with problems beyond what was expected or required? .84
•Voluntarily assist customers by going beyond job requirements? .77
1Because each supervisor rated more than one employee, we
tested for possible statistical dependence in our data by computing
an intraclass correlation statistic (ICC) that reflects the percentage
of the total variance that can be attributed to differences across
groups (James, Demaree, and Wolf 1993). The ICCs for all
variables, except CSC, were insignificant (IRB = .03, ERB = .09,
and agency = .07). The absence of significant values for IRB and
ERB indicated that supervisor-related response motifs or biases, if
they existed, did not affect our results. The ICC(1) for CSC was
.19 (p < .05)—relatively low but still indicative that frontline
employees under a particular supervisor tend to converge slightly
in their assessments of the team’s level of stewardship. Therefore,
we tested our hypotheses twice, first using hierarchical linear
modeling and then using structural equation modeling. Because
these analyses led to similar results, but the latter methodology
accounted for covariance structures in latent constructs captured
by multiple items, we report only the structural equation modeling
results. 
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TABLE 3
Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Focal Constructs
1. CSC 4.83 1.29 1.00
2. AC: goal setting 4.59 1.29 .29** 1.00
3. AC: monitoring 4.34 1.43 .28** .76** 1.00
4. AC: contingent rewards 4.37 1.57 .39** .74** .76** 1.00
5. IRB 5.08 1.22 .29** .36** .45** .41** 1.00
6. ERB 4.82 1.18 .61** .27** .23** .30** .25** 1.00
Control Variables
7. CO 4.48 1.35 .48** .18** .18** .26** .18** .48** 1.00
8. Job satisfaction 5.43 1.29 .04 .00 .09 .33** .03 .18** .12 1.00
9. Organizational commitment 5.71 .89 .01 –.07 –.03 .10 .30** .15** .14* .21** 1.00
10. Support climate 5.83 1.34 .12 .13 .15* .13 .18** .24** .23** .29** .14* 1.00
11. Age 33.70 6.23 –.11 –.15* –.04 .10 .03 .10 .03 .17* .13 –.06 1.00
12. Gender N.A. N.A. –.02 –.04 .01 –.05 –.06 –.13 –.15* –.03 –.06 –.15* –.07 1.00
13. Tenure 4.21 5.34 –.19** –.17 –.17* –.02 –.07 .04 –.07 .17* .14* –.07 .49** .04 1.00
*p < .05. 
**p < .01.
Notes: N.A. = not applicable. AC = agency control.
sonal and customer logs) and ERB (e.g., proactively gather
new customer insights), according to our interviews.
Finally, we controlled for potent alternative predictors of
employee behavior: job satisfaction; organizational com-
mitment (three items each; Mowday, Steers, and Porter
1979); support climate (one item: Salanova, Agut, and Peiró
2005); and employees’ tenure, age, and gender.2
Parceling. We implemented a parceling approach to
reduce the inherent complexity introduced by multidimen-
sional constructs in interactions (Coffman and MacCallum
2005). However, we first ensured that the three agency
dimensions represented a higher-order construct. A second-
order model revealed that all dimensional factor loadings
were greater than .7, the correlations were substantive and
significant, and each dimension’s AVE exceeded the
squared correlations with any other dimensions. Therefore,
domain-representative parceling emerged as the most
appropriate modeling technique (Kishton and Widaman
1994). Our first parcel represented the averaged sum of the
first items from each dimension (i.e., goal setting, monitor-
ing, and rewards), the second parcel featured the averaged
sum of the second items from each dimension, and so forth.
Each dimension contained four items, so we assessed
agency control with four parcels.3 Subsequently, we ran
another CFA in which we replaced the three separate four-
item dimensions with the four-parcel construct. The parcels
displayed greater reliability, drastically reduced random
errors, and offered a higher ratio of common-to-unique fac-
tor variance. In addition, the disaggregated model achieved
a CR of .86, whereas the parcel-based model’s CR reached
.92. Finally, the CFA indicated a significant increase in fit
compared with the initial CFA with separate dimensions
(2(235) = 426.1, p < .01).
Although many studies cluster formal and informal con-
trol situations in quadrants of high-/low-control conditions,
their results are heavily influenced by the criterion used to
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define the quadrants (Cravens et al. 2004). We therefore
modeled the hypothesized moderation effects of agency
control by constructing an interaction term with both con-
trol mechanisms. We applied the unconstrained maximum
information approach that Marsh, Wen, and Hau (2004)
advocate. Initially, we mean-centered all items to avoid
potential multicollinearity issues and then created multipli-
cation pairs by matching agency parcels and stewardship
items by quality. Specifically, we multiplied the highest-
loading agency control parcel (AC4, .91) by the highest-
loading CSC item (CSC1, .87). The second-highest-loading
pair was AC1 (.90) and CSC2 (.86); we also multiplied AC3
(.86) by CSC3 (.83) and AC2 (.76) by CSC5 (.79). 
Data Analysis and Results
To test H1–H6, we ran a structural equation model that
included CSC, agency control, our interaction term, and the
control variables. We integrated CO as a predictor of IRB
and ERB. We used the robust maximum likelihood estima-
tion procedure. Table 5 summarizes the findings. The global
fit statistics point to an acceptable fit of the structural model
with the empirical data: 2(542) = 1108.6, CFI = .94, TLI =
.93, and RMSEA = .06. Overall, our model explained
40.9% of the variance in IRB and 59.3% in ERB.
We found a positive effect of CSC on IRB ( = .18, p <
.05), in support of H1. The effect on ERB was much larger
( = .47, p < .01), in strong support of H2. Agency control
positively related to IRB ( = .38, p < .01), but contrary to
our expectations, it did not indicate any significant effects
on ERB ( = .06, n.s.). Thus, H3 received support, but we
must reject H4. The interaction terms for both controls
showed negative effects on IRB ( = –.13, p < .05) and
ERB ( = –.16, p < .01), which support H6 but not H5.4
CSC or CO?
In our sample, CO did not influence IRB ( = –.02, n.s.),
but it was positively related to ERB ( = .28, p < .01). The
effects of CSC were more profound. Still, we continued to
empirically substantiate that the latter provides additional
value beyond the CO construct. We considered the addi-
tional variance explained in IRB and ERB when we added
CSC to a structural model that included CO and the control
variables. To enable an accurate comparison, we excluded
the interaction term of stewardship and agency control from
these models. We found that the CO-only model explained
35.1% of variance in IRB and 43.8% in ERB. Adding CSC
to this model increased the variance explained to 39.4% and
57.5% in IRB and ERB, respectively. Furthermore, a model
2Items for constructs not in Table 2 appear in the Web Appendix
(www.marketingpower.com/jm_webappendix).
3Compared with alternative parceling techniques, such as
homogeneous parceling, the path coefficient estimates of domain-
representative parceling tend to be conservative, which minimizes
Type II error.
4To assess whether our parceling procedure affects the pattern of
outcomes, we ran an alternative structural model with agency control
based on homogeneous parceling. We created one goal-setting par-
cel, one monitoring parcel, and one reward parcel and again applied
the unconstrained maximum-information approach to build the
inter action term. As we expected, although the number of degrees
of freedom declined, model fit did not improve (2(67) = 48.2,
n.s.). All significant paths from our original analysis remained sig-
nificant, with the exception of the stewardship– IRB relationship,
which approaches significance ( = .15, p = .06). These findings
indicated a consistent pattern across operationalizations.
TABLE 4
Study 1: CSC and CO Principal Component Analysis
Component
Item 1 2
CSC1 .690 .286
CSC2 .680 .368
CSC3 .681 .302
CSC4 .778 .098
CSC5 .794 .099
CO1 –.199 .781
CO2 –.277 .680
CO3 .050 .791
CO4 –.127 .808
CO5 –.017 .858
Notes: Item numbering corresponds to sequence of items in Table 2.
that fully replaced the CO construct with CSC showed a
better global fit than the CO-only model (2CO(284) =
602.4 vs. 2CSC(284) = 518.5). In addition, CSC had
stronger effects than CO on IRB (CO = .04; CSC =.19) and
on ERB (CO = .45; CSC = .60) in these two latter models.
We therefore conclude that CSC is a significantly stronger
predictor of IRB and ERB than CO.
The Control Dilemma: Additional Analyses
Managers face a dilemma when they try to secure optimal
frontline employee behavior. Agency control, at least in our
sample, was far more effective than CSC for securing IRB
( = .38 vs.  = .18), but only stewardship control related sig-
nificantly to ERB ( = .47 vs.  = .06, n.s.). Their negative
interaction effect indicates that applying both control mecha-
nisms would counteract the positive effects of each, which
creates a control dilemma for managers. Therefore, we inves-
tigate whether the dissynergistic interaction effects might be
alleviated by specific manager or employee characteristics.
We built on a behavioral model of charismatic leader-
ship to identify a salient managerial trait (Conger and
Kanungo 1998). That is, charismatic leaders articulate an
attractive vision for the organization and guide followers by
establishing strong emotional connections. We used four
measurement items (Conger and Kanungo 1998). In addi-
tion, social cognitive theory suggests a salient follower
trait, self-efficacy, defined as “people’s judgments of their
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action
required to attain designated types of performances” (Ban-
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dura 1986, p. 391). To measure self-efficacy, we used three
items from Spreitzer (1995).
We employed multiple-group analysis to test the moder-
ating effects of charismatic leadership and self-efficacy on
dissynergistic relationships. First, we split our initial sample
into two subsamples at the median charismatic leadership
value (3.65). Two other subsamples reflected the median
split of self-efficacy scores (4.67). Second, we calculated a
base model in which we freely estimated the structural path
to be moderated and an alternative model in which this path
was fixed. A moderation effect would exist if we were to
observe a significant chi-square change in the comparison
of these two models.
We found compelling results, as we detail in Table 6. A
charismatic leader nullified the dissynergistic effect on ERB,
such that the positive coefficient in the high-charisma group
was insignificant ( = .09, n.s.), but the difference with the
low-charisma group ( = –.20, p < .05) was significant
(2(1) = 4.9, p < .05). High stewardship and agency control
did not negatively affect IRB for employees with high self-
efficacy ( = .11, n.s.), but employees reporting low self-
efficacy suffered this dissynergistic effect on IRB ( = –.24,
p < .05), and the difference indicated a significant chi-square
change (2(1) = 4.3, p < .05). The pattern for ERB was
similar, though the difference observed was not significant.
Discussion
We conclude that CSC helps drive ERB and may even 
augment the effects of agency control on IRB among self-
TABLE 5
Study 1: CSC and Agency Control as Antecedents of IRB and ERB
Hypothesized Model
Hypothesis  t-Value Supported
Hypothesized Path
CSC  IRB H1 .18 1.92 Yes
CSC  ERB H2 .47 5.27 Yes
AC  IRB H3 .38 4.83 Yes
AC  ERB H4 .06 .93 No
AC  CSC  IRB H5 –.13 –2.01 No, significant in
opposite direction
AC  CSC  ERB H6 –.16 –2.57 Yes
CO and Control Variable Paths
CO  IRB –.02 –.22
CO  ERB .28 3.96
Job satisfaction  IRB –.13 –1.44
Job satisfaction  ERB .09 1.26
Organizational commitment  IRB .38 4.86
Organizational commitment  ERB .05 .81
Support climate  IRB .04 .52
Support climate  ERB .09 1.47
Age  IRB .02 .28
Age  ERB –.01 –.18
Gender  IRB –.04 –.56
Gender  ERB –.06 –1.06
Tenure  IRB –.03 –.40
Tenure  ERB –.04 –.66
R2 IRB .409
R2 ERB .593
Notes: Table reports standardized coefficients. AC = agency control. Overall fit measures: ²(542) = 1108.6, CFI = .94, TLI = .93 and RMSEA = .06.
efficacious employees. Furthermore, it explains variance in
IRB and ERB beyond CO. Considering this key role as a
driver of service behavior on the front line, we extend
insights into its nomological network by exploring in Study
2 how organizations might implement CSC. We build on
self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci 2000) to derive
stewardship antecedents; that is, self-regulation in an infor-
mal control framework might suggest individual interpreta-
tions of the service environment but also likely depends on
shared collective perceptions (Jaworski 1988). Previous
studies of marketing control structures have focused almost
exclusively on individuals; Study 2 contributes to extant lit-
erature by accounting for team-level variance to explain
perceptions of CSC.
Study 2
Individual-Level Antecedents of CSC
Intrinsic motivation is a prerequisite for employees to adopt
an other-regarding focus (Davis, Schoorman, and Donald-
son 1997). It involves a “natural inclination toward assimi-
lation, mastery, spontaneous interest, and exploration” that
is essential in many service situations (Ryan and Deci 2000,
p. 70). Intrinsic motivation also leads to behavioral self-
regulation, an essential stewardship mechanism that initi-
ates when behavior deviates from efforts to advance cus-
tomer welfare. Self-determination theory postulates three
innate psychological needs (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999; Ryan and Deci 2000): autonomy, competence, and
relatedness. When met, intrinsic motivational processes
may stimulate employees to self-regulate their actions, in
line with the moral obligation to protect customer welfare
in the covenantal relationship.
First, employee autonomy refers to the degree to which
an employee has the power to make decisions, plan work
activities, and adapt to changing conditions (Kirkman and
Rosen 1999). Proponents of stewardship theory note that “a
steward’s autonomy should be deliberately extended to
maximize the benefits of a steward” (Block 1996, p. 25).
Autonomy increases frontline employees’ growth opportu-
nities and encourages them to accept full responsibility for
customer problems. Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks (2001) sug-
gest that psychological ownership of a customer’s problem
occurs when people are in charge of problem identification
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and solution. In contrast, an employee told exactly what to
do is more likely to disregard the covenantal customer rela-
tionship and blame his or her manager or the organization
for customer dissatisfaction.
Second, a competent frontline employee might experi-
ence customer stewardship because he or she possesses all
the relevant information and required skills to solve a cus-
tomer problem. Service employees with more knowledge
about past and present customer issues develop an internal
locus of control; they perceive more influence over out-
comes and take more responsibility for addressing customer
needs than their uninformed counterparts (Bandura 1986).
Employees who can handle a wide range of service situa-
tions also are more likely to attribute service outcomes to
themselves rather than to external sources (Hui and Toffoli
2002). Such competence encourages employees to accept
responsibility because they are more confident that they can
fulfill the demands that stem from the covenantal relation-
ship with customers.
Third, employee relatedness—or connectedness to oth-
ers in the organization—encourages a sense of responsibil-
ity for tasks performed (Sekiguchi, Burton, and Sablynski
2008). Relatedness is associated with feelings of emotional
and content-related support, which makes frontline employ-
ees more willing to be accountable for their service out-
comes because they believe mistakes will not be held
against them personally. Being embedded in the network of
the organization should cause employees to feel a morally
established obligation to major actors in the network (Her-
nandez 2008). Frontline workers perceive customers as
major stakeholders and are more likely to take ownership of
problems. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H7: (a) Employee autonomy, (b) employee competence, and
(c) employee relatedness positively influence frontline
employee perceptions of CSC.
Team-Level Antecedents of CSC
As more companies organize frontline operations into teams,
team-level phenomena increasingly influence stewardship
control beliefs, beyond individual-level antecedents. Team
members converge in their perceptions of their team’s work
circumstances and establish shared team norms, so we can
distinguish individual- and team-level conceptualizations of
stewardship antecedents. This separation is meaningful; an
TABLE 6
Study 1: Moderating Effects of Charismatic Leadership and Self-Efficacy
Moderating Variable Structural Relationships Moderator Group N  2/d.f.
Charismatic leadership AC  CSC  IRB Low 140 –.19* 2.6
High 122 .03
AC  CSC  ERB Low 140 –.20* 4.9*
High 122 .09
Self-efficacy AC  CSC  IRB Low 138 –.24* 4.3*
High 124 .11
AC  CSC  ERB Low 138 –.27* 1.9
High 124 .05
*p < .05. 
**p < .01.
Notes: Table reports standardized coefficients. AC = agency control.
employee who effectively carries out a specific task but
belongs to an otherwise unsuccessful team may have a high
sense of individual competence and a low sense of team
competence.
Research has stressed the power of psychosocial elements
at the team level (e.g., De Jong, De Ruyter, and Lemmink
2004); therefore, we posit that team-level conceptualizations
of the predictor variables explain additional variance in
individual employees’ stewardship perceptions. Specifi-
cally, in autonomous teams, work structures that facilitate
growth and personal development arise because the whole
team, rather than a hierarchical leader, takes responsibility
for performance (Stewart 2006). The elimination of
inequality and hierarchy motivates frontline employees to
grow and take ownership of customer problems, rather than
adhere to agency guidelines. In competent teams, members
also are confident that their colleagues are skilled and
knowledgeable, which makes satisfying customers more
likely, reduces the risk of a service failure, and makes team
members more willing to be accountable for customers’
overall welfare (Hui and Toffoli 2002). Finally, teams that
feel strongly related to the organizational network recognize
the meaningfulness of their activities, so team members are
more likely to respond with greater persistence and motiva-
tion because they take direct responsibility for handling
customer requests and complaints (Kirkman and Rosen
1999). Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H8: (a) Team autonomy, (b) team competence, and (c) team
relatedness positively influence frontline employee per-
ceptions of CSC.
Method
Research setting. We selected a large, international car
manufacturer as the empirical setting to test H7 and H8.
Frontline employees in the customer contact center receive
questions and complaints from various sources, including
end consumers, affiliated dealers, and service intermedi-
aries, through different channels, such as telephone, e-mail,
social media, and a designated information system. They
are responsible for answering customer inquiries, giving
(un)solicited help and advice, and taking care of organiza-
tional follow-up efforts. Employees also perform customer
and competitor intelligence functions by proactively visit-
ing car exhibitions, dealerships, and fan club days to
observe up-to-date customer experiences.
Sample characteristics. We distributed 437 questionnaires
to frontline employees in Western Europe; we received 234
usable questionnaires, for a response rate of 53.5%. The
respondents represented 35 teams, and 58% were men, 23%
were younger than 26 years, 51% were 26–35 years of age,
and 26% were 36 years or older. Nine percent of the respon-
dents had high school degrees or less, 32% had associate’s
degrees, 31% had bachelor’s degrees, and 28% had graduate
degrees. Their average organizational tenure was 5.1 years.
Measurement. We operationalized all constructs with
multi-item scales; respondents indicated their (dis)agree-
ment with a set of statements using a seven-point Likert
scale. We assessed CSC with five items identical to those
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we employed in Study 1. Three items adapted from Thomas
and Tymon (1993) served to assess employee autonomy.
We measured employee competence with three items,
adapted from Baard, Deci, and Ryan (2004). We operation-
alized employee relatedness with three items proposed by
Holman, Epitropaki, and Fernie (2001). We also adapted the
individual-level scales to reflect the team level of analysis,
with the team as the referent, which should prevent any
scale-related bias in our analyses.
We conducted an individual-level CFA to assess measure-
ment properties. We found good global fit: ²(209) = 559.9,
CFI = .96, TLI = .95, and RMSEA = .08. We also added an
unmeasured latent methods factor to our CFA and set the
correlations with all other latent constructs to 0 (Podsakoff
et al. 2003). The resultant change in model fit was not sig-
nificant, and all factor loadings for the latent variables
remained significant. Therefore, common method bias was
not a significant concern. We provide the factor loadings,
composite reliabilities, and AVEs in Table 7; the correlations
are available in the Web Appendix (www.marketingpower.
com/jm_webappendix).
Data Analysis and Results
We calculated group means for team autonomy, team com-
petence, and team relatedness to estimate team-level effects
in our conceptual framework. To justify data aggregation to
higher levels, we first calculated the rwg(j) statistic and the
ICC(1) coefficient; we found a high degree of consistency
in the individual ratings within groups, as well as reliable
group means. We applied multilevel regression analysis to
test H7 and H8 by estimating the effects at different levels of
analysis simultaneously. We employed MLwiN software
and used iterative least squares estimation to obtain the
parameter estimates. In all analyses, we centered the predic-
tor variables on their grand mean. Finally, we included age,
tenure, education, workload (number of hours worked per
week), and group size as control variables.
In Table 8, we list the results of our multilevel analyses.
Employee autonomy related to CSC but was only border-
line significant in our full model ( = .16, t = 1.90). In an
individual-level only model and an extended model, this
relationship did reach significance. Therefore, we find sup-
port for H7a, though care should be taken in its interpreta-
tion. Employee competence displayed an insignificant coef-
ficient ( = –.08, n.s.), so we must reject H7b. However,
employee relatedness exhibited a strong relationship with
stewardship control ( = .21, p < .01), in support of H7c. At
the team level, team autonomy and team competence had
significant, positive relationships with perceived CSC ( =
.29, p < .05;  = .29, p < .01, respectively), in support of H8a
and H8b. In contrast, we reject H8c, because the group-level
coefficient of team relatedness was not significant ( = –.12,
n.s.). Adding the group-level antecedents to the individual-
level model significantly improved model fit (2(8) = 38.3,
p < .01), and the amount of variance explained at the group
level was higher than that at the individual level (R2 =
13.2%). Thus, the between-group differences explained
additional variance in individual stewardship perceptions,
beyond the within-group differences. Additional analyses
appear in the Web Appendix (www.marketingpower. com/
jm_webappendix).
Discussion
Stewardship does not emerge from formal rules but can be
facilitated by organizational structures that help leaders
encourage followers to act on a felt ownership of and moral
responsibility for customers’ overall welfare. With Study 2,
we have identified key antecedent structures and revealed
that service employees who feel related to the organiza-
tional network and are allowed to act autonomously per-
ceive higher levels of CSC. Study 2 also confirms that
accounting for team-level perceptions helps explain addi-
tional variance in CSC perceptions. Team autonomy and
team competence relate most strongly to CSC.
General Discussion
With this article, we introduce the informal control mecha-
nism of CSC and show that it is more potent in shaping
frontline service employee behaviors than CO. We highlight
how CSC operates in conjunction with agency control and
investigate its multilevel antecedents. Our findings offer
several key insights.
CSC Versus Agency Control
We find differential effects of the two control types. Agency
control primarily drives IRB, and though CSC explains
additional variance, it is not as influential as its formal
counterpart. While CSC is a strong predictor of ERB,
agency control does not significantly influence this behav-
ior. With regard to their interaction, we find that agency
control weakens the effect of CSC on IRB, in contrast to
our expectations. Under CSC, employees informally estab-
lish rules of appropriate behavior in relational exchanges,
but their predictive power toward employees’ IRB dimin-
ishes when reward and monitoring substitute these steward-
ship effects. Agency control also negatively moderates the
effect of CSC on ERB, as we expected. These two dissyner-
gistic interaction effects suggest that employees waste valu-
able resources coping with divergent control structures,
possibly at the expense of the customer, who then receives
poorer or inconsistent service over time.
Overcoming the Control Dilemma 
As a second important finding, we conclude that optimally
guiding frontline employees to perform with a combination
of agency and CSC requires two organizational conditions.
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TABLE 7
Study 2: Measures and Measurement Criteria
Factor
Construct/Item Loading CR AVE
Employee Autonomy .90 .84
I can select different ways to do my work. .82
I make my own choices without being told by management. .87
I have a considerable amount of independence and freedom to decide how to go about .89
my work. 
Employee Competence .93 .81
I feel very competent when I am at work. .90
Most days I feel a sense of accomplishment from working. .91
When I am working I often do not feel very capable. (reverse scored) .89
Employee Relatedness .92 .79
I think that my work fits into the “bigger picture” of my organization. .90
I feel that the different parts of my organization fit together. .93
I think that my work closely relates to that of others. .84
Team Autonomy .90 .75
In our team, we can select different ways to do our work. .88
In our team, we make our own choices without being told by management. .90
In our team, we have a considerable amount of independence and freedom to decide .82
how to go about our work. 
Team Competence .88 .72
Our team feels very competent. .86
Most days, our team feels a sense of accomplishment from working. .87
Our team does not feel very capable. (reverse scored) .81
Team Relatedness .87 .69
In our team, we think that our work fits into the “bigger picture” of our organization. .83
In our team, we feel that the different parts of my organization fit together. .85
In our team, we think that our work closely relates to that of others. .82
Customer Stewardship Control .90 .64
I feel a sense of responsibility for the customer. .82
I feel a sense of accountability for the customer. .85
I sense that the customers I serve are MY customers. .79
I feel a sense of ownership of the customer’s problems. .76
I feel responsible for customer welfare. .80
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TABLE 8
Study 2: Antecedents of CSC
Individual-Level Model Full Model Extended Model
 t-Value  t-Value  t-Value Hypothesis Supported
Individual Level
Employee autonomy .22 2.53 .16 1.90 .18 2.38 H7a Yes
Employee competence –.06 .85 –.08 1.23 –.05 .82 H7b No
Employee relatedness .31 3.42 .21 2.70 .18 2.52 H7c Yes
Team Level
Team autonomy .29 2.30 .34 2.73 H8a Yes
Team competence .29 3.64 .31 3.41 H8b Yes
Team relatedness –.12 .98 –.10 .87 H8c No
Cross-Level Interactions
Team competence  employee relatedness –.15 2.22
Team competence consensus –.07 .73
Team competence consensus  employee autonomy .16 2.30
Control Variables (Individual Level)
Age .11 1.65 .14 2.06 .15 2.13
Tenure –.21 3.00 –.21 3.00 –.20 2.86
Education .06 .95 .01 .19 .01 .21
Work load .01 .09 –.02 .22 –.01 .17
Control Variables (Group Level)
Age –.11 1.04 –.14 1.31
Tenure .01 .10 .03 .27
Education –.01 .12 –.03 .38
Workload .05 .46 –.02 .21
Group size –.04 .58 –.03 .44
R2 .234 .366 .389
Increase in model fit: –2  Log(likelihood) 38.3 (8 d.f.)* 6.74 (3 d.f.)
*p < .01.
Notes: Standardized coefficients.
First, frontline workers may regard agency governance over
their covenantal customer relationships as a sign of mana-
gerial distrust, but charismatic leaders could mitigate this
issue. They should be sensitive to employees’ needs and
able to explain why they impose a combination of controls
(Conger and Kanungo 1998). They also can stimulate
employees to derive meaning and direction from their work,
which may make formal reporting seem less burdensome
and alleviate perceptions of resource depletion, such that
workers are more willing to go the extra mile for customers.
Second, highly self-efficacious employees feel more confi-
dent in their abilities and therefore invest more resources in
situations characterized by an unclear frame. These employ-
ees can better comprehend the parallel between behavioral
heuristics inferred from service encounters and manager-
initiated guidelines, which makes them better able to work
according toward principles and principals concurrently.
CSC Versus CO
In addition to outlining the conceptual differences between
CSC and CO, this study unveils three major empirical differ-
ences. First, CSC enhances employee’s IRB, but CO does not.
This may be due to the more comprehensive focus on the
customer’s welfare in the context of covenantal relationships.
This instigates employees to embrace task responsibilities
that may not address meeting customer needs directly but
safeguard the quality of service provision over different
encounters, such as conscientiously maintaining personal and
customer logs. Second, with regard to ERB, CSC emerged
as a far better predictor than CO. This is reflected in a much
larger effect size (CO = .28 vs. CSC = .47) and a superior fit
of the structural model containing CSC but not CO. Finally,
adding CSC to a CO-only model enhanced the explanatory
power of our model toward both behaviors of interest, but
especially with regard to ERB. We believe that these results
merit more scholarly and practitioner interest for CSC.
CSC: Antecedents at Multiple Levels 
Finally, we reveal that social group structures facilitate the
implementation of CSC among frontline workers. The
social dimension makes employees more aware of their
responsibilities, toward not only customers but also the
organization. The autonomy of a team to function as an
independent unit and the general level of competence
within the team offer strong determinants of individual CSC
perceptions. Team autonomy encourages employees to
share responsibility for their performance toward cus-
tomers, rather than shifting liability to supervisors. Employ-
ees also are more willing to be accountable for customer
outcomes if they trust their peers to do a good job. Con-
versely, doubt about counterparts’ competence prompts a
self-protection mechanism that puts self-interest first,
before stewardship considerations. Individual motivations
also drive employee perceptions of CSC. Employees who
feel related to the organizational network of managers, col-
leagues, teams, and customers recognize how their work
contributes and better balance the interests of stakeholders.
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Limitations and Further Research
Additional avenues for research mirror the limitations of
this study. Our samples do not feature repeated measures of
stewardship, because the employee control structures were
relatively stable in both organizations we studied. Further
studies could investigate the development of customer
stewardship over time, possibly by applying qualitative
techniques. In addition, we propose that a control structure
involves significant evaluative elements and constitutes a
psychological or perceptual state, rather than an objective
reality. Relationships between frontline employees and their
managers should be assessed individually, rather than on a
one-to-many basis, because unstructured work may produce
different individual interpretations. Additional studies might
contrast employee and managerial perspectives on controls.
Finally, research might test the generalizability of our find-
ings in other settings; it is unclear whether these effects
hold across different service categories.
Managerial Implications
Managing frontline employees effectively entails important
challenges, especially as customer contacts proliferate,
grow more unstructured, and take place outside company-
sponsored channels (e.g., social media) and beyond the con-
trol of marketers. Many firms find it increasingly difficult
to develop formal employee guidelines to keep up with
these trends. Our study shows that firms do not need to rely
exclusively on formal control systems. Managers can edu-
cate frontline employees to focus on customers’ overall
welfare; we offer several actionable suggestions.
First, managers should not consider their control actions
in isolation. Although agency control makes employees
work within specified service scripts and CSC prompts
them to go the extra mile to satisfy the customer, the com-
bination of both systems erodes their effectiveness. We pro-
pose two implementation strategies. To start with, managers
should recruit and retain self-efficacious employees, who
tend to adhere to role-prescribed behavior. These employees
then can participate in recruitment and training, act as role
models, and help less confident customer contact employ-
ees prioritize common objectives. In addition, frontline
managers must “walk the talk” by displaying flair and
charisma; their attitudes and actions can overcome
employee distrust and perceptions of resource depletion in
response to combined controls. Managers can learn to be
charismatic through training by group-based case studies,
perspective-taking exercises, and role-playing scenarios
(Morhart, Herzog, and Tomczak 2009).
Second, although stewardship implies that employees
take self-regulative responsibility for customers, managers
must create the social environment and structures for stew-
ardship to emerge. The social context should nurture three
basic needs: (1) autonomy, (2) competence, and (3) related-
ness. We find that it is more effective to make the team,
rather than the individual, autonomous, which requires
cross-training team members in various skills and routines
and encouraging the team to self-manage by assuming
responsibility for customer outcomes. Providing autonomy
also requires a redistribution of accountability at various
organizational levels. This does not have to be complex,
however. For example, the consumer electronics retailer
Best Buy helps customers directly through Twitter-enabled
service. To ensure employee accountability, each tweet
includes a signature that identifies the personal Twitter
account of that employee; a similar strategy might work
with a team signature.
Competence also should be stimulated at the team level.
Efficient procedures to gather and disseminate information
may increase information exchange and thus the level of
competence in a team. One option is to implement groupware
technology that enables employees to share information
Principles and Principals / 17
about who does what to solve a particular customer case
and archive cases of stewardship excellence. Such a tool
also should increase employees’ sense of connection to the
organization, which constitutes the third important condi-
tion for implementing CSC. Rather than a team connection,
managers should nurture individual employee relatedness,
perhaps by improving information exchange or involving
frontline workers in back-office operations. When they real-
ize how customer feedback is processed, employees should
gain a better understanding of organizational processes and
thereby increase their perceptions of the meaningfulness of
their job and their organizational relatedness.
Brown, Tom J., John C. Mowen, D. Todd Donavan, and Jane W.
Licata (2002), “The Customer Orientation of Service Workers:
Personality Trait Effects on Self- and Supervisor Performance
Ratings,” Journal of Marketing Research, 39 (February),
110–19.
Calantone, Roger, Nukhet Harmancioglu, and Cornelia Droge
(2010), “Inconclusive Innovation Returns: A Meta-Analysis of
Research on Innovation in New Product Development,” Jour-
nal of Product Innovation Management, 27 (7), 1065–81.
Caldwell, Cam and Ranjan Karri (2005), “Organizational Gover-
nance and Ethical Systems: A Covenantal Approach to Build-
ing Trust,” Journal of Business Ethics, 58 (1), 249–59.
Celsi, Mary Wolfinbarger and Mary C. Gilly (2010), “Employees
as Internal Audience: How Advertising Affects Employees’
Customer Focus,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Sci-
ence, 38 (4), 520–29.
Challagalla, Goutam N. and Tasadduq A. Shervani (1996),
“Dimensions and Types of Supervisory Control: Effects on
Salesperson Performance and Satisfaction,” Journal of Market-
ing, 60 (1), 89–105.
Ciampa, Dan (1992), Total Quality: A User’s Guide for Implemen-
tation. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Coffman, Donna L. and Robert C. MacCallum (2005), “Using
Parcels to Convert Path Analysis Models into Latent Variable
Models,” Multivariate Behavioral Research, 40 (2), 235–59.
Conger, Jay A. and Rabrinda N. Kanungo (1998), Charismatic
Leadership in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publi-
cations.
Cravens, David W., Felicia G. Lassk, George S. Low, Greg W.
Marshall, and William C. Moncrief (2004), “Formal and Infor-
mal Management Control Combinations in Sales Organiza-
tions: The Impact on Salesperson Consequences,” Journal of
Business Research, 57 (3), 241–48.
Davis, James H., F.D. Schoorman, and Lex Donaldson (1997),
“Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management,” Academy of
Management Review, 22 (1), 20–47.
Deci, Edward L., Richard Koestner, and Richard M. Ryan (1999),
“A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation,” Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 125 (6), 627–68.
De Jong, Ad, Ko De Ruyter, and Jos Lemmink (2004),
“Antecedents and Consequences of the Service Climate in
Boundary-Spanning Self-Managing Service Teams,” Journal
of Marketing, 68 (January), 18–34.
De Ruyter, Ko, Ad De Jong, and Martin Wetzels (2009),
“Antecedents and Consequences of Environmental Steward-
ship in Boundary-Spanning B2B Teams,” Journal of the Acad-
emy of Marketing Science, 37 (4), 470–87.
REFERENCES
Albanese, Robert, M. Tina Dacin, and Ira C. Harris (1997), “Dia-
logue: Agents as Stewards,” Academy of Management Journal,
22 (3), 609–613.
Argyris, Chris (1973), “Organization Man: Rational and Self-
Actualizing,” Public Administration Review, 33 (July/August),
354–57.
Baard, Paul P., Edward L. Deci, and Richard M. Ryan (2004),
“Intrinsic Need Satisfaction: A Motivational Basis of Perfor-
mance and Well-Being in Two Work Settings,” Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 34 (10), 2045–68.
Babakus, Emin, Ugur Yavas, and Nicholas J. Ashill (2009), “The
Role of Customer Orientation as a Moderator of the Job
Demand–Burnout–Performance Relationship: A Surface-Level
Trait Perspective,” Journal of Retailing, 85 (4), 480–92.
———, ———, and ——— (2011), “Service Worker Burnout and
Turnover Intentions: Roles of Person-Job Fit, Servant Leader-
ship, and Customer Orientation,” Services Marketing Quar-
terly, 32 (1), 17–31.
Bandura, Albert (1986), Social Foundations of Thought and
Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Barron, John M. and Kathy A. Paulson Gjerde (1996), “Who
Adopts Total Quality Management (TQM)? Theory and an
Empirical Test,” Journal of Economics & Management Strat-
egy, 5 (1), 69–106.
Bass, Bernard M. and Bruce J. Avolio (2000), Multifactor Leader-
ship Questionnaire: Manual Leader Form, Rater, and Scoring
Key for MLQ (Form5x-Short). Redwood City, CA: Mind Garden.
Bergen, Mark, Shantanu Dutta, and Orville C. Walker (1992),
“Agency Relationships in Marketing: A Review of the Implica-
tions and Applications of Agency and Related Theories,” Jour-
nal of Marketing, 56 (August), 1–24.
Bettencourt, Lance A. and Stephen W. Brown (1997), “Contact
Employees: Relationships Among Workplace Fairness, Job
Satisfaction and Prosocial Service Behaviors,” Journal of
Retailing, 73 (1), 39–61.
——— and ——— (2003), “Role Stressors and Customer-Oriented
Boundary-Spanning Behaviors in Service Organizations,”
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31 (4), 394–408.
Block, Peter (1996), Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self-
Interest. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Blocker, Christopher, Daniel Flint, Matthew Myers, and Stanley
Slater (2011), “Proactive Customer Orientation and its Role for
Creating Customer Value in Global Markets,” Journal of the
Academy of Marketing Science, 39 (2), 216–33.
Brady, Michael K. and J. Joseph Cronin (2001), “Customer Orien-
tation: Effects on Customer Service Perceptions and Outcome
Behaviors,” Journal of Service Research, 3 (3), 241–51.
Deshpandé, Rohit, John U. Farley, and Frederick E. Webster Jr.
(1993), “Corporate Culture, Customer Orientation, and Innova-
tiveness in Japanese Firms: A Quadrad Analysis,” Journal of
Marketing, 57 (January), 23–37.
Donavan, D. Todd, Tom J. Brown, and John C. Mowen (2004),
“Internal Benefits of Service-Worker Customer Orientation:
Job Satisfaction, Commitment, and Organizational Citizenship
Behavior,” Journal of Marketing, 68 (January), 128–46.
Durham, Sarah (2011), “What Fundraisers Can Learn from Zap-
pos,” Fundraising Success Magazine, (November), (accessed
June 21, 2012), [available at http://www.fundraisingsuccessmag.
com/article/what-fundraisers-can-learn-from-zappos-customer-
service-stewardship/1].
Ehrhart, Mark G. (2004), “Leadership and Procedural Justice Cli-
mate as Antecedents of Unit-Level Organizational Citizenship
Behavior,” Personnel Psychology, 57 (1), 61–94.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989), “Agency Theory: An Assessment
and Review,” Academy of Management Review, 14 (1), 57–74.
Financial Reporting Council (2010), “The UK Stewardship Code,”
(accessed June 21, 2012), [available at http://www.frc.org.uk/
corporate/investorgovernance.cfm].
Flaherty, Karen E., Todd J. Arnold, and Shane Hunt (2007), “The
Influence of the Selling Situation on the Effectiveness of Con-
trol: Toward a Holistic Perspective,” Journal of Personal Sell-
ing and Sales Management, 27 (3), 221–33.
———, John C. Mowen, Tom J. Brown, and Greg W. Marshall
(2009), “Leadership Propensity and Sales Performance Among
Sales Personnel and Managers in a Specialty Retail Store Set-
ting,” Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 29
(1), 43–60.
Fornell, Claes and David F. Larcker (1981), “Evaluating Structural
Equation Models with Unobservable Variables and Measure-
ment Error,” Journal of Marketing Research, 18 (February),
39–50.
Franke, George R. and Jeong-Eun Park (2006), “Salesperson
Adaptive Selling Behavior and Customer Orientation: A Meta-
Analysis,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (November),
693–702.
Gallo, Carmine (2007), “How Ritz-Carlton Maintains Its Mys-
tique,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, (February 13), (accessed
June 21, 2012), [available at http://www.businessweek.com/
smallbiz/content/feb2007/sb20070213_171606.htm].
Gray, Brendan, Sheelagh Matear, Christo Boshoff, and Phil Math-
eson (1998), “Developing a Better Measure of Market Orienta-
tion,” European Journal of Marketing, 32 (9/10), 884–903.
Grinstein, Amir (2008), “The Effect of Market Orientation and Its
Components on Innovation Consequences: A Meta-Analysis,”
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36 (2), 166–73.
Hackman, J. Richard and Gary R. Oldham (1975), “Development
of the Job Diagnostic Survey,” Journal of Applied Psychology,
60 (2), 159–70.
Hale, Jeff R. and Dail L. Fields (2007), “Exploring Servant Lead-
ership Across Cultures: A Study of Followers in Ghana and the
USA,” Leadership, 3 (4), 397–417.
Harris, Eric G., John C. Mowen, and Tom J. Brown (2005), “Re-
Examining Salesperson Goal Orientations: Personality Influ-
ences, Customer Orientation, and Work Satisfaction,” Journal
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 33 (1), 19–35.
Hartline, Michael D., James G. Maxham, and Daryl O. McKee
(2000), “Corridors of Influence in the Dissemination of 
Customer-Oriented Strategy to Customer Contact Service
Employees,” Journal of Marketing, 64 (April), 35–50.
Hendricks, Kevin B. and Vinod R. Singhal (1997), “Does Imple-
menting an Effective TQM Program Actually Improve Operat-
ing Performance? Empirical Evidence from Firms That Have
Won Quality Awards,” Management Science, 43 (9), 1258–74.
18 / Journal of Marketing, November 2012
——— and ——— (2001), “The Long-Run Stock Price Perfor-
mance of Firms with Effective TQM Programs,” Management
Science, 47 (3), 359–68.
Hernandez, Morela (2008), “Promoting Stewardship Behavior in
Organizations: A Leadership Model,” Journal of Business
Ethics, 80 (1), 121–28.
——— (2012), “Toward an Understanding of the Psychology of
Stewardship,” Academy of Management Review, 37 (2),
172–93.
Holman, David, Olga Epitropaki, and Sue Fernie (2001), “Under-
standing Learning Strategies in the Workplace: A Factor Ana-
lytic Investigation,” Journal of Occupational & Organizational
Psychology, 74 (5), 675–81.
Homburg, Christian, Marko Grozdanovic, and Martin Klarmann
(2007), “Responsiveness to Customers and Competitors: The
Role of Affective and Cognitive Organizational Systems,”
Journal of Marketing, 71 (July), 18–38.
———, Michael Müller, and Martin Klarmann (2011a), “When
Does Salespeople’s Customer Orientation Lead to Customer
Loyalty? The Differential Effects of Relational and Functional
Customer Orientation,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science, 39 (6), 795–812.
———, ———, and ——— (2011b), “When Should the Customer
Really Be King? On the Optimum Level of Salesperson Cus-
tomer Orientation in Sales Encounters,” Journal of Marketing,
75 (March), 55–74.
Hu, Jia and Robert C. Liden (2011), “Antecedents of Team
Potency and Team Effectiveness: An Examination of Goal and
Process Clarity and Servant Leadership,” Journal of Applied
Psychology, 96 (4), 851–62.
Hui, Michael K. and Roy Toffoli (2002), “Perceived Control and
Consumer Attribution for the Service Encounter,” Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 32 (9), 1825–44.
James, Lawrence R., Robert G. Demaree, and Gerrit Wolf (1993),
“An Assessment of Within-Group Interrater Agreement,” Jour-
nal of Applied Psychology, 78 (2), 306–309.
Jaworski, Bernard J. (1988), “Toward a Theory of Marketing Con-
trol: Environmental Context, Control Types, and Conse-
quences,” Journal of Marketing, 52 (July), 23–39.
——— and Deborah J. MacInnis (1989), “Marketing Jobs and
Management Controls: Toward a Framework,” Journal of Mar-
keting Research, 26 (November), 406–419.
———, Vlasis Stathakopoulos, and H. Shanker Krishnan (1993),
“Control Combinations in Marketing: Conceptual Framework
and Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Marketing, 57 (January),
57–69.
Kazanjian, Robert K. and Hyagreeva Rao (1999), “Research Note:
The Creation of Capabilities in New Ventures—A Longitudinal
Study,” Organization Studies, 20 (1), 125–42.
Kennedy, Karen Norman, Jerry R. Goolsby, and Eric J. Arnould
(2003), “Implementing a Customer Orientation: Extension of
Theory and Application,” Journal of Marketing, 67 (October),
67–81.
Kirkman, Bradley L. and Benson Rosen (1999), “Beyond Self-
Management: Antecedents and Consequences of Team
Empowerment,” Academy of Management Journal, 42 (1),
58–74.
Kishton, Joseph M. and Keith F. Widaman (1994), “Unidimen-
sional Versus Domain Representative Parceling of Question-
naire Items: An Empirical Example,” Educational and Psycho-
logical Measurement, 54 (3), 757–65.
Kohli, Ajay, and Bernard J. Jaworski (1990), “Market Orientation:
The Construct, Research Propositions, and Managerial Impli-
cations,” Journal of Marketing, 54 (April), 1–18.
Kwortnik, Robert J., Michael Lynn, and William T. Ross (2009),
“Buyer Monitoring: A Means to Insure Personalized Service,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 46 (October), 573–83.
Latham, George and Edwin A. Locke (2002), “Building a Practi-
cally Useful Theory of Goal Setting and Task Motivation,” The
American Psychologist, 57 (9), 705–717.
Lee, Hyun-Jung (2004), “The Role of Competence-Based Trust
and Organizational Identification in Continuous Improve-
ment,” Journal of Managerial Psychology, 19 (6), 623–39.
Licata, Jane W., John C. Mowen, Eric G. Harris, and Tom J.
Brown (2003), “On the Trait Antecedents and Outcomes of
Service Worker Job Resourcefulness: A Hierarchical Model
Approach,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31
(3), 256–71.
Luo, Xueming, Maxwell Hsu, and Sandra Liu (2008), “The Mod-
erating Role of Institutional Networking in the Customer 
Orientation–Trust/Commitment–Performance Causal Chain in
China,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36 (2),
202–214.
Lusch, Robert F. and Bernard J. Jaworski (1991), “Management
Controls, Role Stress, and Retail Store Manager Performance,”
Journal of Retailing, 67 (4), 179–87.
Lytle, Richard S., Peter W. Hom, and Michael P. Mokwa (1998),
“SERV*OR: A Managerial Measure of Organizational Service-
Orientation,” Journal of Retailing, 74 (4), 455–89.
MacKenzie, Scott B., Philip M. Podsakoff, and Michael Ahearne
(1998), “Some Possible Antecedents and Consequences of In-
Role and Extra-Role Salesperson Performance,” Journal of
Marketing, 62 (July), 87–98.
Mael, Fred and Blake E. Ashforth (1992), “Alumni and Their
Alma Mater: A Partial Test of the Reformulated Model of
Organizational Identification,” Journal of Organizational
Behavior, 13 (2), 103–123.
Marsh, Herbert W., Zhonglin Wen, and Kit T. Hau (2004), “Struc-
tural Equation Models of Latent Interactions: Evaluation of
Alternative Estimation Strategies and Indicator Construction,”
Psychological Methods, 9 (3), 275–300.
Morhart, Felicitas M., Walter Herzog, and Torsten Tomczak
(2009), “Brand-Specific Leadership: Turning Employees into
Brand Champions,” Journal of Marketing, 73 (September),
122–42.
Mowday, Richard T., Richard M. Steers, and Lyman W. Porter
(1979), “The Measurement of Organizational Commitment,”
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 14 (2), 224–47.
Narver, John C. and Stanley F. Slater (1990), “The Effect of a
Market Orientation on Business Profitability,” Journal of Mar-
keting, 54 (October), 20–35.
Netemeyer, Richard G., James G. Maxham, and Chris Pullig (2005),
“Conflicts in the Work–Family Interface: Links to Job Stress,
Customer Service Employee Performance, and Customer Pur-
chase Intent,” Journal of Marketing, 69 (April), 130–43.
Neubert, Mitchell J., K. Michele Kacmar, Dawn S. Carlson,
Lawrence B. Chonko, and James A. Roberts (2008), “Regula-
tory Focus as a Mediator of the Influence of Initiating Structure
and Servant Leadership on Employee Behavior,” Journal of
Applied Psychology, 93 (6), 1220–33.
Ng, Kok-Yee, Christine Koh, and Hock-Chye Goh (2008), “The
Heart of the Servant Leader: Leader’s Motivation-to-Serve and
Its Impact on LMX and Subordinates’ Extra-Role Behavior,” in
Knowledge-Driven Corporation-Complex Creative Destruc-
tion, George B. Graen and Joan A. Graen, eds. Charlotte, NC:
Information Age, 125–44.
Parasuraman, A., Leonard Berry, and Valarie A. Zeithaml (1991),
“Perceived Service Quality as a Customer-Based Performance
Measure: An Empirical Examination of Organizational Barri-
ers Using an Extended Service Quality Model,” Human
Resource Management, 30 (3), 335–64.
Pettijohn, Charles E., Linda S. Pettijohn, and A.J. Taylor (2002),
“The Influence of Salesperson Skill, Motivation, and Training
on the Practice of Customer-Oriented Selling,” Psychology and
Marketing, 19 (9), 743–57.
Principles and Principals / 19
Pierce, Jon L., Tatiana Kostova, and Kurt T. Dirks (2001),
“Toward a Theory of Psychological Ownership in Organiza-
tions,” Academy of Management Review, 26 (2), 298–310.
Podsakoff, Philip M., Scott B. MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon Lee, and
Nathan P. Podsakoff (2003), “Common Method Bias in Behav-
ioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recom-
mended Remedies,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 88 (5),
879–903.
Rod, Michel and Nicholas J. Ashill (2010), “The Effect of Cus-
tomer Orientation on Frontline Employees Job Outcomes in a
New Public Management Context,” Marketing Intelligence &
Planning, 28 (5), 600–624.
Román, Sergio and Dawn Iacobucci (2010), “Antecedents and
Consequences of Adaptive Selling Confidence and Behavior: A
Dyadic Analysis of Salespeople and Their Customers,” Journal
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38 (3), 363–82. 
Rozell, Elizabeth J., Charles E. Pettijohn, and R. Stephen Parker
(2004), “Customer-Oriented Selling: Exploring the Roles of
Emotional Intelligence and Organizational Commitment,” Psy-
chology & Marketing, 21 (6), 405–424.
Ryan, Richard M. and Edward L. Deci (2000), “Self-Determination
Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social
Development, and Well-Being,” American Psychologist, 55
(1), 68–78.
Salanova, Marisa, Sonia Agut, and José María Peiró (2005),
“Linking Organizational Resources and Work Engagement to
Employee Performance and Customer Loyalty: The Mediating
Role of Service Climate,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 90
(6), 1217–27.
Schaubroeck, John, Simon S. Lam, and Ann Chunyna Peng
(2011), “Cognition-Based and Affect-Based Trust as Mediators
of Leader Behavior Influences on Team Performance,” Journal
of Applied Psychology, 96 (4), 863–71.
Schepers, Jeroen J.L., Ad de Jong, Ko de Ruyter, and Martin Wet-
zels (2011). “Fields of Gold: Perceived Efficacy in Virtual
Field Service Employee Teams,” Journal of Service Research,
14 (3), 372–89.
Sekiguchi, Tomoki, James P. Burton, and Chris J. Sablynski
(2008), “The Role of Job Embeddedness on Employee Perfor-
mance: The Interactive Effects with Leader–Member Exchange
and Organization-Based Self-Esteem,” Personnel Psychology,
61 (4), 761–92.
Smidts, Ale, Ad Th.H. Pruyn, and Cees B.M. Van Riel (2001),
“The Impact of Employee Communication and Perceived
External Prestige on Organizational Identification,” Academy
of Management Journal, 44 (5), 1051–62.
Smith, Greg (2012), “Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs,” The
New York Times, (March 14), (accessed June 21, 2012), [avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-
leaving-goldman-sachs.html?_r=1].
Spreitzer, Gretchen M. (1995), “Psychological Empowerment in
the Workplace: Dimensions, Measurement, and Validation,”
Academy of Management Journal, 38 (5), 1442–65.
Stewart, Greg L. (2006), “A Meta-Analytic Review of Relation-
ships Between Team Design Features and Team Performance,”
Journal of Management, 32 (1), 29–55.
Suh, Taewon, Mark B. Houston, Steven M. Barney, and Ik-Whan
G. Kwon (2011), “The Impact of Mission Fulfillment on the
Internal Audience: Psychological Job Outcomes in a Services
Setting,” Journal of Service Research, 14 (1), 76–92.
Taylor, Fred (2008), “Being Proactive: The Next Generation of
Customer Service–Part One,” Blog Southwest, (January 23),
(accessed June 25, 2012), [available at http://www.blogsouth-
west. com/2008/01/23/being-proactive—the-next-generation-
of-customer-service—part-one/].
Thomas, Kenneth W. and Walter G. Tymon (1993), Empowerment
Inventory. Tuxedo, NY: Xicom.
Thomas, Raymond W., Geoffrey N. Soutar, and Maria M. Ryan
(2001), “The Selling Orientation–Customer Orientation
(S.O.C.O.) Scale: A Proposed Short Form,” Journal of Per-
sonal Selling & Sales Management, 21 (1), 63–69.
Tosi, Henry L., Amy L. Brownlee, Paula Silva, and Jeffrey P. Katz
(2003), “An Empirical Exploration of Decision-Making Under
Agency Controls and Stewardship Structure,” Journal of Man-
agement Studies, 40 (8), 2053–71.
Tsai, Shu-pei (2005), “Utility, Cultural Symbolism and Emotion:
A Comprehensive Model of Brand Purchase Value,” Interna-
tional Journal of Research in Marketing, 22 (3) 277–91.
Van Dierendonck, Dirk (2011), “Servant Leadership: A Review
and Synthesis,” Journal of Management, 37 (4), 1228–61.
———, Inge Nuijten, and Imke Heeren (2009), “Servant Leader-
ship, Key to Follower Well-Being,” in Power and Inter-
dependence in Organizations, Dean Tjosvold and Barbara
Wisse, eds. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
319–37.
Vecchio, Robert P., Joseph E. Justin, and Craig L. Pearce (2008),
“The Utility of Transactional and Transformational Leadership
for Predicting Performance and Satisfaction Within a Path-
Goal Theory Framework,” Journal of Occupational & Organi-
zational Psychology, 81 (1), 71–82.
Walumbwa, Fred O., Russell Cropanzano, and Chad A. Hartnell
(2009), “Organizational Justice, Voluntary Learning Behavior,
and Job Performance: A Test of the Mediating Effects of Iden-
tification and Leader–Member Exchange,” Journal of Organi-
zational Behavior, 30 (8), 1103–1126.
20 / Journal of Marketing, November 2012
———, Chad A. Hartnell, and Adegoke Oke (2010), “Servant
Leadership, Procedural Justice Climate, Service Climate,
Employee Attitudes, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior:
A Cross-Level Investigation, Journal of Applied Psychology,
95 (3), 517–29.
Washington, Rynetta R., Charlotte D. Sutton, and Hubert S. Feild
(2006), “Individual Differences in Servant Leadership: The
Roles of Values and Personality,” Leadership and Organiza-
tional Development Journal, 27 (8), 700–716.
Wieseke, Jan, Michael Ahearne, Son K. Lam, and Rolf van Dick
(2009), “The Role of Leaders in Internal Marketing,” Journal
of Marketing, 73 (March), 123–45.
———, Johannes Ullrich, Oliver Christ, and Rolf Van Dick (2007),
“Organizational Identification as a Determinant of Customer
Orientation in Service Organizations,” Marketing Letters, 18
(4), 265–78.
Yavas, Ugur and Emin Babakus (2010), “Relationships Between
Organizational Support, Customer Orientation, and Work Out-
comes: A Study of Frontline Bank Employees,” International
Journal of Bank Marketing, 28 (3), 222–28.
Zablah, Alex, George Franke, Tom Brown, and Darrell
Bartholomew (2012), “How and When Does Customer Orien-
tation Influence Frontline Employee Job Outcomes? A Meta-
Analytic Evaluation,” Journal of Marketing, 76 (May), 21–40.
Principles and Principals: Do Customer Stewardship and Agency Control Compete or 
Complement When Shaping Frontline Employee Behavior? 
 
Jeroen Schepers, Tomas Falk, Ko de Ruyter, Ad de Jong, Maik Hammerschmidt 
 
 
Web Appendix 
 
 
ITEM WORDINGS OF CONSTRUCTS NOT IN TABLE 1 
 
Charismatic leadership (Conger and Kanungo 1998) 
1. My supervisor has a vision that he tries to achieve with creative ideas. 
2. My supervisor permanently creates new ideas to make this organization ready for the future. 
3. My supervisor is able to motivate me by articulating effectively the importance of what I am 
doing. 
4. My supervisor is an exciting public speaker. 
 
Self-efficacy (Spreitzer 1995) 
1. I am confident about my ability to do my job. 
2. I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my work activities. 
3. I have mastered the skills necessary for my job. 
 
Support climate (Salanova, Agut, and Peiro 2005) 
1. I am provided with tools, technology, and other resources to support the delivery of quality 
work and service. 
 
Job satisfaction (Hackman and Oldham 1975) 
1. Generally speaking, I am very satisfied with this job. 
2. I am generally satisfied with the kind of work I do in this job. 
3. I frequently think of quitting this job. (reverse coded) 
 
Organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers, and Porter 1979) 
1. I find that my values and the organization’s values are very similar. 
2. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization. 
3. I really care about the fate of this organization. 
 
STUDY 2 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Focal constructs          
1. Customer stewardship control   .79** .75** .74** .21 .05 .35* .29 -.24 
2. Autonomy .37**   .56** .72** .43* .19 .42* .30 -.21 
3. Competence .10 .35**   .66** .21 .12 -.09 .17 -.12 
4. Relatedness .39** .55** .25**   .30 .10 .17 .20 -.24 
Control variables                   
5. Age .13 .18** .12 .24**   .73** -.04 .44** -.23 
6. Tenure -.03 .23** .15* .29** .47**   -.19 .52** -.11 
7. Education .07 .10 .08 .04 -,09 -.11   .28 -.15 
8. Workload .14* .24** .11 .39** .29** .33** -.10   -.08 
9. Group size -.08 -.14* -.08 -.03 -.13* -.02 -.01 .04   
          
*p < .05.  
**p < .01.          
Notes: Coefficients below the diagonal represent individual-level correlations (N = 234); coefficients above the diagonal represent 
group-level correlations (N = 35). 
 
CROSS-LEVEL INTERACTIONS: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 The divergent findings between individual- and team-level phenomena raise the question 
of whether variables at different levels interact in their relationships with customer stewardship 
control. We therefore explored the existence of significant cross-level interactions in our 
multilevel model and display the results in the “Extended model” column in Table 7. 
The interaction of team competence and employee relatedness was associated negatively 
with customer stewardship control. If a frontline employee operates in a team whose members 
feel highly competent to do their work, his or her relatedness to the organization is less relevant 
in relation to customer stewardship control perceptions. In highly competent teams, individual 
members are capable of encouraging their colleagues to act as good customer stewards; they take 
a motivational role in the employee’s network and connections with others in the organization.  
To analyze potential interaction effects further, we model within-team consensus by 
taking the reverse-coded standard deviations of team autonomy, team competence, and team 
relatedness. We find that the interaction of team competence consensus and employee autonomy 
relates positively to customer stewardship control. In a team environment in which members 
strongly agree about their competences, the individual freedom to make decisions and choices 
may relate more strongly to customer stewardship control, because individual employees are not 
hindered by the dissenting opinions of their colleagues. They are more willing to take 
responsibility and ownership of the customer’s problem, because it is less likely that other 
members will hold suboptimal performance against them, or alternatively, shirk in recognition of 
their accomplishments. 
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